The Tinba Trojan aka Tiny Banker targeted Czech bank customers this summer; now it’s gone global.
After an analysis of a payload distributed by Rig Exploit kit, the AVAST Virus Lab identified a payload as Tinba Banker. This Trojan targets a large scope of banks like Bank of America, ING Direct, and HSBC.
In comparison with our previous blogpost, Tinybanker Trojan targets banking customers, this variant has some differences, which we will describe later.
How does Tiny Banker work?
- 1. The user visits a website infected with the Rig Exploit kit (Flash or Silverlight exploit).
- 2. If the user’s system is vulnerable, the exploit executes a malicious code that downloads and executes the malware payload, Tinba Trojan.
- 3. When the computer is infected and the user tries to log in to one of the targeted banks, webinjects come into effect and the victim is asked to fill out a form with his/her personal data.
- 4. If he/she confirms the form, the data is sent to the attackers. This includes credit card information, address, social security number, etc. An interesting field is “Mother’s Maiden Name”, which is often used as a security question to reset a password.
Tinba Trojan specifically targets bank customers with deceitful debt notice.
The Tinba Trojan is banking malware that uses a social engineering technique called spearfishing to target its victims. Recently, targets have been banking customers in Czech Republic, AVAST Software’s home country. Tinba, aka Tiny Banker or Tinybanker, was first reported in 2012 where it was active in Turkey. A whitepaper analyzing its functionality is available here (PDF). However, the spam campaigns against bank users in Czech Republic are still going on and have became more intensive. Here is an example of what Czech customers recently found in their email inbox.
VÝZVA K ÚHRADĚ DLUŽNÉHO PLNĚNÍ PŘED PROVEDENÍM EXEKUCE
Soudní exekutor Mgr. Bednář, Richard, Exekutorský úřad Praha-2, IČ 51736937, se sídlem Kateřinská 13, 184 00 Praha 2
pověřený provedením exekuce: č.j. 10 EXE 197/2014 -17, na základě exekučního titulu: Příkaz č.j. 077209/2014-567/Čen/G V.vyř.,
vás ve smyslu §46 odst. 6 z. č. 120/2001 Sb. (exekuční řád) v platném znění vyzývá k splnění označených povinností, které ukládá exekuční titul, jakož i povinnosti uhradit náklady na nařízení exekuce a odměnu soudního exekutora, stejně ták, jako zálohu na náklady exekuce a odměnu soudního exekutora:
Peněžitý nárok oprávněného včetně nákladu k dnešnímu dni: 9 027,00 Kč
Záloha na odměnu exekutora (peněžité plnění): 1 167,00 Kč včetně DPH 21%
Náklady exekuce paušálem: 4 616,00 Kč včetně DPH 21%
Pro splnění veškerých povinností je třeba uhradit na účet soudního exekutora (č.ú. 549410655/5000, variabilní symbol 82797754, ČSOB a.s.), ve lhůtě 15 dnů od
doručení této výzvy 14 810,00 Kč
Nebude-li uvedená částka uhrazena ve lhůtě 15 dnů od doručení této výzvy, bude i provedena exekuce majetku a/nebo zablokován bankovní účet povinného ve smyslu § 44a odst. 1 EŘ a podle § 47 odst. 4 EŘ. Až do okamžiku splnění povinnosti.
Příkaz k úhradě, vyrozumění o zahájení exekuce a vypučet povinnosti najdete v přiložených souborech.
Za správnost vyhotovení Alexey Mishkel
Bailiff [Academic title] [First name] [Last name], Distraint office Prague-2 ID: 51736937 at Katerinska 13, 184 00 Prague 2 was authorized to proceed the execution 10 EXE 197/2014 -17 based on execution Order 077209/2014-567/Cen/G according to §46 paragraph 4, 120/2001 law collection in valid form which impose you to pay these costs:
Debt amount: 9,027.00 CZK ($445.00)
Distraint reward: 1,167 including 21% TAX
Fixed costs: 4,616 CZK including 21% TAX
Total: 14,810 CZK ($730.00)
To bank account 549410655/5000, variable symbol 82797754, CSOB a.s.
For the correctness of the copy warrants Alexey Mishkel
Using the spearfishing social engineering tactic, the attackers attempt to scare their victims with a specially designed email message explaining that a debt exists which needs to be paid.
The path from the creation of malicious program to its delivery onto victims’ computers is long nowadays and involves many different players with the same goal – to make a financial gain. Malware authors usually offer their software to cyber criminals who in turn distribute it via underground forums. This is the how they keep their anonymous status. We have previously seen many famous malicious programs start this way.
In the past, the Russian banking Trojan Carberp was heavily advertised on shady forums. In the beginning of the year, an attempt to sell a new ransomware called Prison Locker was reported. Last year, we blogged about Trojan Solarbot which choose to promote itself through a well- designed website, appearing very official.
However, we don’t always know all the details about every piece of malware, from the code to how it is being distributed. The Trojan dubbed i2Ninja, for example, made headlines last year, but we never received a real sample containing all the functionalities the media reported on. Or do you remember the Hand of Thief Trojan for Linux desktops? Its variant for the Android platform was also advertised, but again, we never encountered it in our Virus Lab. These advertisements could have lacked the real code behind them or may have gone under in the pile of cyberthreats.
In March 2013 a new banking Trojan dubbed Minerva was introduced on a Russian forum. We will see that it is awfully successful in what it promised to do. Read more…
In recent days, the avast! Virus Lab has observed a high activity of malware distributed through exploit kits. Most cases of infection are small websites which usually provide adult entertainment, but there was also news about one of the top 300 visited websites being infected.
Infection chains ended dropping a final payload in a form of an executable file with a constant, not wide-spread name like 1SKKKKKKK.exe. After a closer look, we found that this filename is shared among aggressive malware threats – banking Trojans like Win32:Citadel, Win32:Shylock/Caphaw, Win32:Ranbyus, Win32:Spyeye; stealthy infostealers like Win32:Neurevt (a.k.a. BetaBot), Win32:Gamarue, Win32:Cridex, Win32:Fareit; and even file infectors like Win32/64:Expiro(infected dbghlp.exe).
We received ~1000 unique samples in the last 10 days which possess suspicious filenames, polymorphically covering ~30 malware families with many different packers. Researching infected iframes in our databases, we discovered an infection chain which leads to a payload with a strange name that looks like this:
In today’s world where malware evolves and develops rapidly, sharing security information is the key element for success. Companies which ignore this fact sooner of later suffer from the consequences of their bad decision. Malware researchers from all over the world regularly meet at various IT security conferences, where they learn from each other how to fight with malware and how to make the IT world a safer place.
Let us present the long-term analysis of malware which was designed to steal credentials from more than 25 largest banking and payment systems in Brazil. The unique features of this banking malware include the usage of valid digital certificates, 3 years of evolution and stealing credentials from e-commerce admin pages. This feature opens doors for attackers, who can then log in to e-commerce systems and steal information about customers and their payments.
This malware family combines all of these powerful functionalities and serves as a comprehensive tool for stealing money and sensitive personal data with dangerous efficiency.
Financial malware threatens our banks and the safety of our personal identify and hard-earned money. Evidence from private research suggests that most endpoint security solutions offer minimal to no protection against financial malware. However, in a new test, avast! Internet Security provided 100% protection against banking malware.