Recently, we discovered an account on GitHub, a service for software development projects, that has interesting contents. The account contains several projects; one of the latest ones is called Banks, and it has interesting source codes. The account contains information like user name, photo, and email address, but we cannot tell who the guy in the picture is. He might not be related to the contents at all, it could be a fake picture, fake name, or simply his account may have been hacked, his identity stolen, and the Banks repository created by someone else without his consent. In this blog post, we will explore the source codes in detail.
When we downloaded the repository, we found several directories – GoogleService and fake applications imitating mobile applications of five major Korean banks – NH Bank, Kookmin Bank, Hana Bank, ShinHan Bank and Woori Bank.
We previously published two blog posts with analyses of the above mentioned fake applications.
When we look at GitHub statistics, and Punchcard tab, it tells us what time the creators were most active. From the chart below you can see, that Saturday mornings and evenings and Sunday evenings were the most active times of comments of new versions. It seems that authors of this application do the development as a weekend job. At the time of writing this blogpost, the last update of fake bank applications was in the beginning of January 2014.
This is not the first attack against users of Korean banks. About a year ago, we published this analysis.
Github, the web-based hosting service for software development projects, offers a lot of interesting contents, which depending on its settings can be later found and accessed by virtually anyone, including Google robots. We managed to find the above mentioned repository by simply Googling the strings which occurred in a malicious Android application.
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Official app stores are the primary sources to finding and downloading apps. Experts advise users to stay within the official app stores as they are approved ecosystems, which are widely recognized as safe. But are these sources really trustworthy? Some experts, however, claim that “Android malware is non-existent and security companies just try to scare us. Keep calm and don‘t worry.“ So which is it?
We’ve already blogged about plenty of threats that sneak onto your device from trusted sources, but here we have a really fresh one, one that is still undetected by other security vendors. An Application called Cámara Visión Nocturna (package name: com.loriapps.nightcamera.apk), which is still available in the Google Play Store as I am writing this post, is something you definitely don’t want to have on your Android device.
Starting with the application’s permissions you might notice there are some unusual requests for an app that should be able to work only using your camera.
<uses-permission android:name=”android.permission.CAMERA” />
In February, we looked at the first part of the fake Korean bank application analysis along with Android:Tramp (TRAck My Phone malicious Android application), which uses it. In this blogpost, we will look at another two Android malware families which supposedly utilize the same bunch of fake Korean bank applications. At the end of this article, we will discuss the origin of malware creators.
Analysis of Android:AgentSpy
It is interesting to search for references of bank applications package names – KR_HNBank, KR_KBBank, KR_NHBank, KR_SHBank, KR_WRBank. One reference goes to a malicious application called Android:AgentSpy. The infection vector of this application was described by Symantec, contagio mobile and Alyac. We will not delve into details, we will just mention that the malicious application is pushed to a connected mobile phone via ADB.EXE (Android Debug Bridge). The uploaded malicious file is called AV_cdk.apk.
Android:AgentSpy contains activity MainActivity and several receivers and service CoreService.
Monitors android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED and android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT and if received, starts CoreService. It also monitors attempts to add or remove packages – android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED and android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REMOVED.
1) Calls regularly home and reports available connection types (wifi, net, wap), IMSI, installed bank apps
2) Regularly polls C&C and responds to the following commands
sendsms – sends SMS to a given mobile number
issms – whether to steal received SMS or not
iscall – whether to block outgoing call
contact – steals contact information and upload them to C&C
apps – list of installed bank apps
changeapp – replaces original bank applications with fake bank applications
move – changes C&C server
Moniors new outgoing calls. If android.intent.action.NEW_OUTGOING_CALL is received, information about the outgoing call is sent to C&C.
Contains C&C URL, name of bank packages (String array bank), name of fake bank packages (String array apkNames). It also contains reference to conf.ini configuration file.
Analysis of Android:Telman
One more Android malware family, which uses fake bank applications is called Android:Telman. Similarly to Android:Tramp and Android:AgentSpy, it checks for installed packages of the above mentioned banks. Read more…
About a year ago, we published this analysis about a pharming attack against Korean bank customers. The banks targeted by cybercriminals included NH Bank, Kookmin Bank, Hana Bank, ShinHan Bank, and Woori Bank. With the rise of Android-powered devices, these attacks now occur not only on the Windows platform, but also on the Android platform. In this blogpost we will look at a fake bank application and analyze several malware families which supposedly utilize them.
Original bank application
We will show just one bank application for brevity. For other banks the scenario is similar. The real Hana Bank application can be downloaded from Google Play. It has the following layout and background.
Beware of malformed FileZilla FTP client versions 3.7.3 and 3.5.3. We have noticed an increased presence of these malware versions of famous open source FTP clients.
The first suspicious signs are bogus download URLs. As you can see, the installer is mostly hosted on hacked websites with fake content (for example texts and user comments are represented by images.)
Malware installer GUI is almost identical to the official version. The only slight difference is version of NullSoft installer where malware uses 2.46.3-Unicode and the official installer uses v2.45-Unicode. All other elements like texts, buttons, icons and images are the same.
The installed malware FTP client looks like the official version and it is fully functional! You can’t find any suspicious behavior, entries in the system registry, communication or changes in application GUI.
The only differences that can be seen at first glance are smaller filesize of filezilla.exe (~6,8 MB), 2 dll libraries ibgcc_s_dw2-1.dll and libstdc++-6.dll (not included in the official version) and information in “About FileZilla” window indicates the use of older SQLite/GnuTLS versions. Any attempt to update the application fails, which is most likely a protection to prevent overwriting of malware binaries.
In our blog, we wrote several times about various types of Ransomware, most recently about CryptoLocker. In most cases, ransomware has pretended to be a program installed into a victim’s computer by the police. Because of some alleged suspicious activities found on the user’s computer, ransomware blocks the user from using the computer and demands a ransom to unlock the machine or files.
Different ransomware families have different graphics and skins, usually showing intimidating images of handcuffs, logos of various government and law enforcement organizations, policemen performing inspections, government officials, etc… You can read some of our previous analyses on our blog – Reveton, Lyposit, Urausy – are the most prolific examples of such ransomware.
In this blog post, we will look at the functionally of the same type of ransomware, but one which displays more annoying and disturbing photos. After showing the message saying, “Your computer has been suspended on the grounds of viewing illegal content,” accompanied with the current IP address, name of internet service provider (ISP) and the geographical location, it displays several pictures of child pornography!
Today we are going to talk to those of you who use Bitcoin digital currency to pay for a variety of goods and services – along with a warning about yet another source of Bitcoin miners – the sharing services. You may think that if you avoid cracks and keygens while browsing the web you will be safe. Well, we would recommend that you reconsider that position. Recently we found that on the uloz.to file sharing service someone uploaded a lot of fake files containing Bitcoin miners!
Bitcoin Mining service
First a little background for the uninitiated: Bitcoins can be obtained by trading real currency, goods, or services with people who have them or alternatively, through mining. The mining process involves running software that performs complex math problems for which you’re rewarded a share of the income. There are a finite amount of Bitcoins to be had, and mining for them can be compared to extracting gold or diamonds from the earth. The more you get, the fewer there are to be had, so it becomes increasingly harder and more expensive. Here’s a descriptive article about mining.
Bitcoin mining services such as bitminter.com use shared computer resources of their users to mine new Bitcoins. In order to participate, the mining users have to create an account and then register their computers (workers) with the service. Then they simply run the Bitcoin miner program provided with their credentials on as many computers as they have. In the end, if they had enough computation power and time they might end up with a few Bitcoins.
It can be expected that some people will not be satisfied just using their own machines so they will try to use the computing power of unsuspecting victims. And that’s exactly what the authors of this malware are doing: They use hardware that does not belong them to generate more money.
It’s not a Bitcoin problem; it’s a people problem
We must stress that there’s nothing wrong with Bitcoin or its mining services. The problem is that some greedy people are misusing them.
Some of them can be seen on the following image. The word “cestina” means that the file should contain Czech localization of the referenced program. All of them contain a hidden feature, and sometimes the name is a complete fabrication. For example, The-Night-of-the-Rabbit-cestina.exe contains a crack for Call of Duty 4. Notice too, that all these files have an elevated popularity; no doubt a result of tampering. Some downloaders already suspect something fishy about these files.
Grum, one of the largest spamming botnets, suspected to be responsible for over 17% of worldwide spam (as described here), which was “killed” in July 2012, still lives. We have been tracking its activity since January 2013. We can confirm spiderlab’s doubts about the grum killing published in March 2013. The following article provides some details about registered grum activity.
We have seen grum activity on following sites:
Every bot client generates its own identification number (ID) on its first run. The length of the ID is 32 characters. The first three correspond with a bot version and the other 29 characters are randomly generated. It is also set to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\BITS\ID registry key, which is queried on every run.
After the bot sets its ID, it tries to connect to a C&C server.
1) The bot contacts C&C server with a HTTP GET request to get the FQDN of the client’s computer
2) The information is used to contact one of the SMTP servers obtained from DNS MX records from following domains which are used for sending spam:
3) Then the C&C server is contacted by the following request
The smtp variable is set to ‘ok’ when the bot successfully contacts one of the SMTP servers and set to ‘bad’ if it does not.
4) The C&C server answers with a message which looks like a typical BASE64 encoding
Actually the message is encrypted by RC4 algorithm with key equals to the bot’s ID and then it is encoded by BASE64.
The whole decryption algorithm written in C# could look like this:
The bot id is 72176717204370682282907051332175 for the mentioned message.
After decryption process we can see the message:
5) The bot remembers the ot variable and sends the HTTP task request without the ot variable.
6) The C&C answers with spamming instructions including spam mail template which is also encrypted by the schema mentioned above.
The interesting thing is that sent spam is similiar to scam described on our blog in the past.
Finally, we provide a screenshot of encrypted instructions, a spam email and an example of decrypted instructions .
Received: by work.ozucfx.net (Postfix, from userid %W_RND_INT)
id E%W_RND_INTCE%W_RND_INTE; %DATE
From: Work at Home <%FROM_EMAIL>
Subject: Your second chance in life just arrived
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Let us present the long-term analysis of malware which was designed to steal credentials from more than 25 largest banking and payment systems in Brazil. The unique features of this banking malware include the usage of valid digital certificates, 3 years of evolution and stealing credentials from e-commerce admin pages. This feature opens doors for attackers, who can then log in to e-commerce systems and steal information about customers and their payments.
This malware family combines all of these powerful functionalities and serves as a comprehensive tool for stealing money and sensitive personal data with dangerous efficiency.
The Android:FakeInst family of malware seems to be never ending story. Its creators have been trying to trick users into sending premium rate SMS messages for several months now. Just a few days ago, we discovered 25 more apps placed on alternative markets that are all based on very similar concepts as was the one in the story we wrote about before Christmas.
This time malicious Android applications are hosted on several domains:
All these sites were registered a week ago so it looks like they were supposed to serve as a malware hosting for the bad guys from the very beginning. Also if someone tries to access these sites from the browser, the visitor only receives a 404 error message which does not look like a legitimate site. Analyzing the trail the malware creators left for us, we’ve discovered a few sites they have used in order to attract users and all of them target Russian speaking people and look like an alternative markets. In reality, these sites exist for a short period of time and offers only fake downloaders. Read more…