The begining of spring seems to be an unsuccessful period of the year for cybercriminals in Eastern Europe. There is recent news referring to a neutralization of a group of hackers by joint cooperation between the Security Service of Ukraine with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) on the web. These hackers are responsible for the infamous Trojan called Carberp.
Due to this recent information, we are allowed to say that Carberp was as a mainstream Trojan that monitored the environment of infected computers and exploited remote banking systems. It was a robust modular malware that improved its capabilities by drive-by-downloaded dynamic libraries – plugins. It was not only successfully grabbing money from victim’s bank accounts but also the attention of security experts both in an industrial and an academic sphere (an example of a paper). Therefore there are plenty of references on the web considering the methods of a system invasion, protection by polymorphic outer layers and a persistence of the Trojan. We will try to fill in some gaps in the picture.
Carberp started its progress approximately in autumn 2010. Later in spring 2011 it was split into two main branches regarding the form of HTTP requests. Read more…
Let us present the long-term analysis of malware which was designed to steal credentials from more than 25 largest banking and payment systems in Brazil. The unique features of this banking malware include the usage of valid digital certificates, 3 years of evolution and stealing credentials from e-commerce admin pages. This feature opens doors for attackers, who can then log in to e-commerce systems and steal information about customers and their payments.
This malware family combines all of these powerful functionalities and serves as a comprehensive tool for stealing money and sensitive personal data with dangerous efficiency.
In this blog post, we will look at the attack originating from hxxp://www.spc.or.kr/ and targeting several major Korean banks.
Several days ago we received a complaint about javascrpt.ru. After a bit of research, we found that it tries to mimic ajax.google.com and jquery, but the code is an obfuscated/packed redirector.
After removing two layers of obfuscation, we found a list of conditions checking visitors’ user Agent. From these conditions. we got a clue and focused on mobile devices.
Recently we encountered a very suspicious piece of code on some Joomla-powered webpages. The code looks as if garbled and without any special meaning, and starts like this:
I don’t know what kind of curiosity leads people to the dark corners of the internet, when they want to obtain a new version of antivirus software. It’s somehow irrational to find security software at insecure places. But…. it happens.
As you can see, the file name is Avast_Antivirus_2012_Trial_Verion.exe – but it is definitely not a proper setup released by us. Here are some facts, that are worth remembering:
In October we wrote on our blog about a spreading Russian Trojan horse named the Bicololo. Since that time, the malware has continued to evolve and spread even further. Nowadays avast! saves several thousand PCs every day from its infection.
Through a collaboration with Eric Romang (@eromang), independent security researcher we can confirm that the watering hole campaigns are still ongoing and are targeting multiple targets, including as an example a major Hong Kong political party website.
This website is actually using the new version of the original Internet Explorer (CVE-2012-4792) vulnerability attack, but right now it’s also using the latest Java (CVE-2013-0422) vulnerability.
This website is a legitimate compromised website used for hosting the exploit files, hosted in South Korea.
As a malware analyst, I sometimes have to deal with files, which cannot be classified as computer virus or malware, but their behavior when executed by user is still considered unwanted or suspicious. In this blogpost, we will look at an adware downloader. It comes in two different versions, one tiny – having only about 17KB and being written in .NET, and the other one bigger, using getrighttogo downloader builder. In user’s computer, downloader was found in the following directory.
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrador\Meus documentos\Downloads\filme(1).exe
Users’ computer got infected via one of many sites similar to following ones – websites offering to download movies. After clicking on download links, .exe files were offered to download.
Figure 1 – Example of site the downloader was originally downloaded from